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FANTASIES AND ILLUSIONS: ON LIBERTY, ORDER, AND FREE MARKETS 
Bernard E. Harcourt1  
Forthcoming in the Cardozo Law Review 
Symposium Issue on Fantasy and Markets 
 
Abstract 
Critical thinkers have used various terms to describe the collective 
imaginary that has real effects on individuals, society, and politics. 
Freud used the term “einer Illusion” to characterize religious 
belief in his work, The Future of an Illusion, though many others in 
the psychoanalytic tradition would turn to the notion of fantasy. 
Marx sometimes used the term illusion and he notoriously 
deployed the optical illusion and the phantasmagoria in his famous 
discussion of commodity fetishism. (And Marx, of course, is the 
father of Ideologiekritic). Foucault at times used the language of 
fantasy and phantasms, in an early period deployed the term 
illusion, and in later works adamantly rejected the word illusion. 
(He would always resist the term ideology). What is the difference 
between an illusion, a fantasy, and ideology? What is the right 
term to describe these collective imaginaries that have real effects 
on social and political conditions? In this essay, the first of a 
triptych, I explore the relation between two of these notions, 
namely illusions and fantasies, in the concrete context of the myth 
of the “free market.” 
                                                            
1 Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Professor and Chairman of the Political Science Department, The 
University of Chicago. Special thanks to Renata Salecl and Jeanne Schroeder for bringing us all together 
to fantasize about markets, and to all the participants and Simon Critchley for their thoughts and 
comments on this essay. 
2 
 
FANTASIES AND ILLUSIONS: ON LIBERTY, ORDER, AND FREE MARKETS 
Bernard E. Harcourt  
 
 In an opening passage of The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception 
(1963), Michel Foucault describes a treatment and cure for hysteria—what was called at the time 
“vapeurs” or “the neurosis of distinguished ladies.”2 It was an eccentric cure that doctor Pierre 
Pomme developed and discussed in his 1763 treatise, Traité des affections vaporeuses des deux 
sexes. It involved taking baths for “ten or twelve hours a day, for ten whole months”3 and 
resulted in, what Pomme saw and described as, “membranous tissues” peeling away and 
“pass[ing] daily with the urine,” “the right ureter also peel[ing] away and [coming] out whole in 
the same way,” and the intestines “peel[ing] off their internal tunics” and “emerg[ing] from the 
rectum.”4  
 Foucault suggests that we are today incapable of making sense of Pomme’s discourse. In 
contrast to the medical discourse of anatomical dissection of the nineteenth century, which 
remains legible to us, Pomme’s treatise, “lacking any perceptual base” Foucault writes, “speaks 
to us in the language of fantasy.”5 The word Foucault uses, in the original, is “fantasmes,” the 
form of the common genus that somewhat privileges sight.6 The term carries a visual, 
                                                            
2 Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Vintage 1994). The quoted 
passage is from Ellenberger p.187 which captured nicely Pierre Pomme’s intervention in his treatise, 
Traité des affections vaporeuses des deux sexes; ou l'on tâche de joindre à une théorie solide une 
pratique sûre, fondée sur des observations (see http://www.vialibri.net/item_pg/6589554-1763-pomme-
pierre-trait-des-affections-vaporeuses-des-deux-sexes-che.htm).  
3 Pomme 1763, quoted in Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, p. ix. 
4 Id.  
5 Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic at p. x.  
6 Michel Foucault, Naissance de la clinique. Une archéologie du regard médical (Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1963), p. vi.  
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hallucinatory element.7 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in his Phenomenology of Perception, writing in 
1945, would deploy the term “fantasme” in precisely this sense of a hallucinatory vision.8 Now, 
Foucault would come to regret the emphasis on the visual or perceptive element, on the “gaze,” 
on the idea of “medical perception,” six years later in The Archaeology of Knowledge (1969).9 
But the term was never exclusively visual. It was about our inability to see and say, together: to 
comprehend. Pomme’s discourse is, today, a “fantasme” in that it is not, or is no longer in our 
realm of truth – “dans le vrai (within the true) of contemporary biological discourse,” as 
Foucault would write.10 It is fantasy to us today because Pomme “spoke of objects, employed 
methods and placed himself within a theoretical perspective totally alien” to us.11 As Foucault 
explained in his inaugural lecture at the Collège de France in 1970, “one would only be in the 
true … if one obeyed the rules of some discursive ‘policy’ which would have to be reactivated 
every time one spoke.”12  
 Earlier in the century, in 1927, Sigmund Freud had published a book with the title The 
Future of an Illusion, using the term “illusion” to capture the notion of a desired set of beliefs.13 
The guiding principle of usage was wish-fulfillment, or as he wrote “fulfillments of the oldest, 
strongest and most urgent wishes of mankind.”14 The German term Freud used was “einer 
                                                            
7 See http://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/phantasme.  
8 See Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de perception, 1945, at p. 344 (“Je voyais en marge de mon champ 
visuel et à quelque distance une grande ombre en mouvement, je tourne le regard de ce côté, le fantasme 
se rétrécit et se met en place : ce n'était qu'une mouche près de mon œil. J'avais conscience de voir une 
ombre et j'ai maintenant conscience de n'avoir vu qu'une mouche »). 
9 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (Vintage 1972), at p. 54 n.1 (“In this respect, the term 
‘regard médical’ used in my Naissance de la clinique was not a very happy one”).  
10 Michel Foucault, The Discourse on Language, in The Archaeology of Knowledge (Vintage 1972), at p. 
224.  
11 Id. at 224.  
12 Foucault, The Discourse on Language, at 224.  
13 Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. James Strachey (1989) 
14 Id. at p. 30. 
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Illusion,”15 a term intended to connote the strength of the beliefs: “The secret of their strength 
lies in the strength of those wishes,” Freud explained.16 Religious belief, which Freud defined as 
“teachings and assertions about facts and conditions of external (or internal) reality which tell 
one something that one has not discovered for oneself and which lay claim to one’s belief,”17 are 
illusions; but as illusions, they are not the same thing as errors, nor are they necessarily 
erroneous. “Illusions need not necessarily be false—that is to say, unrealizable or in 
contradiction to reality.”18 Similarly, they are also not the same as delusions, whose essential 
character is to be “in contradiction with reality.”19 “Thus we call a belief an illusion when a 
wish-fulfillment is a prominent factor in its motivation, and in doing so we disregard its relations 
to reality, just as the illusion itself sets no store by verification.”20 
 Sixty years earlier, in 1867, Karl Marx had famously used the metaphor of the 
“phantasmagoria”—the theatrical use of a laterna magica to project frightening images on a 
screen—to describe commodity fetishism.21 Here too, religion played an important role as a 
central analogy for this form of mystification. “In order to find an analogy, we must have 
recourse to the mist-enveloped regions of the religious world,” Marx claimed. “In that world the 
productions of the human brain appear as independent beings endowed with life, and entering 
into relation both with one another and the human race.”22 The same is true with things qua 
commodities, Marx explains: “There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in 
                                                            
15 Sigmund Freud, Die Zukunft einer Illusion (1927). 
16 Freud, The Future of an Illusion, p. 30. 
17 Id. at p. 25. 
18 Id. at p. 31. 
19 Id. at p. 31. 
20 Id. at p. 31.  
21 [Tucker, Marx-Engels Reader, p. 321]; in Marx 1976 at p. 165.  
22 Marx-Engels Reader at p. 321. 
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their eyes, the phantasmagoric23 form of a relation between things.”24 The idea, here, involves an 
optical illusion. And, of course, Marx used the notion of perception, of the optic nerve, of sight, 
as a way to distinguish this particular phenomenon—the fetishism of commodities—from our 
perceptible senses: 
In the same way the light from an object is perceived by us not as the subjective 
excitation of our optic nerve, but as the objective form of something outside the eye 
itself. But, in the act of seeing, there is at all events, an actual passage of light from one 
thing to another, from the external object to the eye. There is a physical relation between 
physical things. But it is different with commodities.25 
Marx’s discussion of commodity fetishism is steeped in visual allegories—in sight and optics. 
The phantasmal dimension of Marx was pronounced.26 
* * *  
Foucault’s fantasmes, Freud’s Illusion, and Marx’s phantasmagoria: these represent, to 
my mind, a surprising inversion of the signifier. I would have expected Foucauldian illusions, 
Freudian fantasies, and, well, Marxian ideologies. But these texts resist, even though the 
subsequent history of usage would vary. Psychoanalysis, as we all know, would embrace the 
notion of fantasies,27 while Foucault would eventually reject, vehemently, the concept of 
illusions,28 and the Frankfurt School would turn, as we know well, to Ideologiekritik.29  
                                                            
23 Translated as “fantastic” in most English translations, but should read “phantasmagoric.” 
24 Marx-Engels Reader at p. 321. 
25 Marx-Engels Reader at p. 321.  
26 Marx also deployed the notion of illusion; the monetary system, for instance, Marx described explicitly 
as “the illusions of the monetary system.” Marx-Engels Reader at p. 328. See also the discussion of this in 
Jacques Derrida, “What is Ideology?” in Specters of Marx, translated by Peggy Kamuf, Routledge 1994. 
27 Especially through Slavoj Zižek’s reading of Lacan. See, his The Plague of Fantasies (London: Verso 
1997), and Chapter 4 in How to Read Lacan, “From Che vuoi? to Fantasy: Lacan with Eyes Wide Shut.” 
28 See infra at p. __. 
29 See, generally, Raymond Geuss, The Idea of A Critical Theory: Habermas & The Frankfurt School 
(Cambridge University Press, 1981), at p. 26-44; see especially p. 39-41 for a contrast between ideology, 
illusion and delusion. 
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 How then do these terms—phantasms and fantasies, illusions and delusions, ideologies—
relate to each other when we are dealing with a phenomenon like “the market”? Today, we so 
often imagine markets as living, volitional, or agentic objects, as things onto which we project 
social relations, or as entities with autonomous or quasi-autonomous existence. It is 
commonplace, today, as Jean and John Comaroff suggest, to “displace political sovereignty with 
the sovereignty of ‘the market,’ as if the latter had a mind and a morality of its own.”30 Our 
fantasies of the “free market” join together the imaginary of a living market with the desire for 
freedom, giving birth to this organism of the market that can exist freely, that can manage itself 
and flourish and prosper, that can regulate itself, and that can shower benefits on us all. (Though, 
of course, if it is in fact a living thing, then it could equally well be satanic, a little devil, a 
monster).  
How exactly do we theorize the fantasy versus the illusion? How do the different ways in 
which we describe our imagination of the market—whether in terms of fantasies, illusions, 
ideologies, or some other kinship term—reflect different dimensions of that act of imagining? 
And how can we make progress, if necessary, in formulating a better way of exploring and 
discussing all this? These are the tasks of this essay. First, to explore how each one of these 
connected terms helps describe our imagination of the market today—our fantasies of 
orderliness, our aspirations to freedom, and our myths of free markets. Second, to move forward 
in articulating a more productive formulation for our critical enterprise.   
I. Imagining the Free Market: Fantasies and Illusions 
                                                            
30 Comaroff and Comaroff 2001:43. 
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In her marvelous book Choice, Renata Salecl explores our late-modern anxiety over 
choosing through the lens of the Lacanian concept of “the Big Other’—the imaginary social 
order of language, institutions, and culture that make up our social space.31 This imaginary social 
order, Salecl suggests, mediates our anxiety with choice—choice which has become a central, 
self-identifying notion of late-modernity. Through various mechanisms, we find ways of binding 
ourselves precisely in order to avoid choice. Salecl writes: “my claim is that people already form 
their own self-binding mechanisms, although these are not developed consciously: they are not 
‘rational’ strategies. People limit their choices by themselves, or they act as though someone else 
had imposed limits for them.”32 
In her text, Salecl discusses Dany-Robert Dufour’s provocative suggestion that “in 
postmodernity there is no more symbolic Big Other” and that “in such a society the market 
becomes the Big Other.”33 That would be the free market, I take it—which seems entirely right, 
in important and intriguing ways. The orderliness of the free market and the lack of choice—the 
naturalness of the free market—are central to alleviating our anxiety. The combination of order 
and liberty is what relieves us of choice. Salecl adds: “In order to find at least temporary stability 
in terms of our identity, we create a fantasy scenario about the consistency of the social sphere 
we inhabit.”34 It is this notion of a fantasy scenario that brings us to the heart of our inquiry and 
of this symposium on fantasy and markets—and it raises the central question of the different 
valences of the terms illusion and fantasy.  
                                                            
31 Renata Salecl, Choice (London: Profile Books 2010), at p. 59. 
32 Salecl, Choice, at p. 145. 
33 Id. at p. 67. 
34 Id. at p. 59. 
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Let’s see if we can make any progress with the terms themselves. The element of desire 
in the notion of “fantasy,” naturally, emphasizes wish-fulfillment in the Freudian sense, but also 
an idea of playfulness. There is something enjoyable, often libidinal, something that satisfies the 
person who believes. It satisfies a desire. It tastes good. Think of the illustrations that Freud uses 
in his own discussion: the middle-class girl who imagines that a prince will sweep her away, the 
alchemist who believes that he can turn metals into gold, our hope that children are “creatures 
without sexuality,” or even racist beliefs like those of “certain nationalists that the Indo-
Germanic race is the only one capable of civilization.”35  
 It is never clear, of course, whether fantasies benefit or harm us. They do both. Surely 
though, they are not only harmful. Fantasies can make life bearable, though they can also lead us 
to error. As compared to delusions, or even illusions perhaps, fantasies can be a wonderful 
escape. The funny thing about fantasies, though, is that sometimes they are so extravagant or 
unrestrained that the person fantasizing should know herself that they are unreal. In that sense, 
the person may be complicit in the act of fantasizing.  
 By contrast, the illusion (and phantasm) underscores the spectral element—the visual—
but through that, the idea of projection, raising the question of agency and subjectivity: who is it 
that is projecting the image? The phantasmagoria may have created a spectral, haunting image on 
the background of the theatre stage, but it required someone projecting the image. Is there, then, 
an actor creating the illusion? The delusional would underscore, first, a clear departure from 
reality, but second and more importantly, it would pick up on the idea of self-deception. The 
person who believes, in the case of a delusion, is deceiving themselves. She bears responsibility. 
She is somehow the creator, she gave birth to that deception.  
                                                            
35 Freud, The Future of an Illusion, at p. 30-31.  
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 Some of this is reflected in Raymond Geuss’ discussion of Freud’s distinction between 
error (“Irrtum”), illusion (“Illusion”), and delusion (“Wahnidee”) in The Future of an Illusion. 
On Guess’ reading, the error consists in no more than “a normal, everyday, false factual belief, 
e.g. the belief that Sigmund Freud was born in Vienna.”36 (He was born in Freiberg in Mähren, 
Moravia, in the former Austrian Empire; and incidentally, his birth name was Sigismund 
Schlomo Freud). By contrast, the delusion is, according to Geuss, “a false belief an agent holds 
because holding this belief satisfies some wish the agent has;” the example here is of “a man 
who falsely believes that he is Charlemagne because his belief satisfies his wish to be an 
important historical personage.”37 (Notice that this, of course, would verge on a diagnosable 
mental illness under contemporary standards; elsewhere, Geuss uses the terms delusion and false 
consciousness interchangeably38). And the Freudian illusion, as we saw earlier, may or may not 
be false or in error, but “is held by the agent because it satisfies a wish.”39 Here is Geuss’s 
rendition of the example of the middle-class girl who believes—has the “illusion”—that a prince 
will come sweep her away: “It may in fact turn out that a prince does come and marry her—in 
Freud’s Vienna there were such princes around, although probably not very many, so the girl’s 
chances were rather slim—but the reason she believes that she will marry a prince is that this 
belief satisfies some wish she has.”40 
 The difficulty in all this, of course, is that the signified shifts along with the signifier. As 
Geuss elegantly notes, even Freud’s treatment “is not as clear and unambiguous as one might 
                                                            
36 Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory, at p. 39.  
37 Id. at p. 39. 
38 Id. at p. 19, 20, and 60.  
39 Id. at p. 39. 
40 Id. at p. 39.  
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wish.”41 The terms are defined differently in different contexts, and the theorists themselves shift 
course often from one text to another. There is no Archimedean point. Foucault’s writings are a 
good illustration.  
During the early 1970s, Foucault used the term “illusion” freely. In his 1974 lectures on 
Psychiatric Power, Foucault in fact used the term to pinpoint one of his more penetrating 
interventions—the claim about the illusion of Man: “What I call Man, in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, is nothing other than the kind of after-image [image rémanente] of this 
oscillation between the juridical individual… and the disciplinary individual… [And] from this 
oscillation between the power claimed and the power exercised, were born the illusion and the 
reality of what we call Man.”42 Similarly, in those lectures, and in 1975 in Discipline and Punish, 
Foucault drew importantly on the notion of optics and optical illusions to discuss the 
panopticon.43  
However, a few years later, Foucault would begin to, and then repeatedly reject the use of 
the term “illusion”—as well, for that matter, as the word “error” (and, of course, “ideology”44). 
For Foucault, regimes of truth are by no means a mere illusion, even though they are made to 
appear and eventually will disappear. Madness, delinquency, and sexuality are not illusions, even 
if they are the product of a whole series of practices that gave birth to something that did not 
                                                            
41 Id. at p. 39. 
42 Foucault, Psychiatric Power, trans. Graham Burchell, at p. 58 (emphasis added). 
43 See, e.g., id. at p. 77; Foucault, Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan, at p. 200-201. 
44 Foucault was more consistent in resisting the term “ideology.” For a general discussion, see Bernard E. 
Harcourt, "Radical Thought from Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, Through Foucault, to the Present: 
Comments on Steven Lukes' 'In Defense of False Consciousness'," University of Chicago Legal Forum 
(2011); see also Foucault’s discussion of ideology in Archaeology of Knowledge, written in 1966, at p. 
184 
11 
exist beforehand and continues not to exist.45 Foucault’s project, he himself emphasized, is not to 
demonstrate that these things are no more than “villainous illusions or ideological products that 
must be dissipated in the light of reason”—“de vilaines illusions ou des produits idéologiques à 
dissiper à la [lumière] de la raison enfin montée à son zenith.”46 Instead, as Foucault explained 
in his lectures on The Birth of Biopolitics in 1979, “The goal of these studies is to demonstrate 
how the pairing of series of practices and regimes of truth forms an apparatus of knowledge-
power that marks effectively in reality that which does not exist and submits it to the exclusion 
of truth and falsity.”47 Nevertheless, in all his investigations, these things that still do not exist, 
even though they have been born and are indeed something real, are not mere illusions: “They 
are not an illusion since it is precisely a set of practices, of real practices, that have established 
them and mark them imperiously in the real.”48  
 Foucault’s own usage of the term “illusion” would shift over time as he toiled over the 
signification he would give the concept. But of this, of course, we are all familiar—we, who toil 
over words for a living. None of the terms have a natural content or valence. In the end, 
exploring the somewhat contingent dimensions of each word may not be as helpful as examining 
closely the object itself—the free market. So let me turn there. 
II. Proposing a Theory of the Imaginary 
                                                            
45 Michel Foucault, Naissance de la biopolitique. Cours au Collège de France. 1978-1979 
(Gallimard/Seuil 2004), at p. 21-22. 
46 Id. at 21. 
47 Id. at 22. 
48 Id. at 22. Foucault would develop these themes as well in his lecture “Qu’est-ce que la critique ? 
[Critique et Aufklärung],” lecture delivered at the Société française de philosophie, 27 May 1978), 
Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie, t. LXXXIV, 1990, p. 35-63 (English translation, “What Is 
Critique?” 41-82, in Michel Foucault, The Politics of Truth, Sylvère Lotringer ed. (Los Angeles: 
Semiotext(e), 2007)).  
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Here, then, is the most precise articulation of what I would call the fantasy or the illusion 
of free markets. First, there is a widely-shared, dominant belief in this country that free markets 
are better and more efficient than government regulation; that, in effect, the state tends to be 
incompetent when it comes to economic regulation. This is captured well by Barack Obama, who 
stated, during the 2008 campaign, that free markets are “the best mechanism ever invented for 
efficiently allocating resources to maximize production.”49 The opinion polls offered ample 
support. So, for instance, in a Financial Times/Harris Poll opinion poll conducted in September 
2007, 49% of respondents in the United States answered affirmatively—in contrast to 17% who 
responded negatively—to the question “Do you think a free-market, capitalist economy (an 
economic system in which prices and wages are determined by unrestricted competition between 
businesses, with limited government regulation or fear of monopolies) is the best economic 
system or not?”50 In a twenty-nation poll conducted by the Program on International Policy 
Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of Maryland, researchers found that an average 71 percent of 
respondents in the United States agree with the statement that “The free enterprise system and 
free market economy is the best system on which to base the future of the world;” only 24% of 
respondents disagreed with that statement.51 Although those polling results preceded the Great 
Recession of 2008, they continue to reflect contemporary reality. In August and September 2009, 
a Gallup Poll survey found that the majority of Americans “believed that there was either too 
much regulation, or about the right amount,” whereas only a quarter of Americans felt there was 
“too little government regulation of business and industry.” In another poll conducted in January 
                                                            
49 Quoted in David Leonhardt, “[Advanced] Obamanomics” in New York Times Magazine, August 24, 
2008, p. 28-54.  
50 See The Harris Poll® #94, September 27, 2007 (available at 
http://www.harrisi.org/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=810).  
51 See 20-Nation Poll Finds Strong Global Consensus: Support for Free Market System But Also More 
Regulation of Large Companies (available at 
http://www.globescan.com/news_archives/pipa_market.html).  
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2010, Gallup found that 57% of Americans were “worried that there will be too much 
government regulation of business,” with only 37% of Americans worrying that there will not be 
enough. On a related question, Gallup discovered that “Half of Americans believe the 
government should become less involved in regulating and controlling business, with 24% 
saying the government should become more involved and 23% saying things are about right.”52 
There is a dominant belief in this country that the free market system is better than government 
regulation. 
Second, this shared conviction rests on an underlying belief that free markets actually 
exist, in other words that there can be constructed spaces of voluntary, compensated economic 
exchange that are not or are less regulated, or that are self-regulated. It is premised, in essence, 
on either a categorical distinction between free markets and regulated economies or, 
alternatively, on a spectrum from free to regulated market economies. This is evident from the 
very questions posed in the polling data. Underlying the questions and answers is this shared 
belief that some forms of economic organization involve more and others less government 
regulation. To most people, this is simply assumed. It is nevertheless important to spell out. I 
would add that this underlying belief that free markets actually exist is a complex production of 
truth, firmly held, and deeply entrenched, with a long history going back at least to the 
Physiocrats, Adam Smith, and 18th century debates over public economy. The contemporary idea 
of the efficiency of competitive markets traces back to the emergence of the idea of natural order 
in the writings of François Quesnay, Mirabeau, and Le Mercier de la Rivière. It traces back to 
their famous Tableau économique, which was one of the first conceptualizations and 
                                                            
52 See Frank Newport, “Americans Leery of Too Much Gov’t Regulation of Business; Republicans in 
particular are worried about too much government regulation, February 2, 2010, available at 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/125468/Americans-Leery-Govt-Regulation-Business.aspx.  
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visualizations of a space of economic exchange that could thrive best without governmental 
interference.53 
Third—and here, at the heart of the claim of fantasy or illusion, is where matters become 
more contested—the free market does not exist. The categorical distinction between free and 
regulated economies—or the spectrum, if you prefer, since a spectrum is no more than a 
graduated expression of binary difference—is erroneous and misleading. As I argue in The 
Illusion of Free Markets, there is no such thing in our physical world as free markets: All 
markets, all forms and venues of economic exchange, are man-made, constructed, regulated, and 
administered by often-complex mechanisms that necessarily distribute wealth in large and small 
ways.54 The state is always present in market organization and its level of involvement does not 
change. In a purportedly free market, the state is just as present, enforcing private contracts, 
preventing and punishing trespass on private property, overseeing, regulating, and enforcing 
through criminal, administrative, and civil sanctions the markets themselves, and distributing 
wealth through the tax code, military spending, bureaucratic governance, and myriad other 
means. The state creates, maintains, and regulates free markets extensively—criminalizing 
market bypassing, fraud, misrepresentation, and other deviations from the “orderly” course of 
human affairs. Whenever the state is not explicitly directing economic behavior or setting 
prices—as, for instance, in controlled economies—it is nevertheless present in equal magnitude 
enforcing breaches of contract, criminalizing insider trading, corners, and unfair trade practices, 
defining and protecting private property, and punishing black-market activity. In the end, the 
categories of free and regulated markets are misleading heuristic devices.  
                                                            
53 See Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets, at p. 86-87. 
54 Id. at p. 176-190. 
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Fourth, and finally, these misleading categories are deeply entrenched in our systems of 
knowledge and belief, and they have real effects—what we would call, in French, “des effets de 
vérité.” Even though they are not themselves true, correct, or accurate, they have “truthful” 
effects on the real world. They are not mere mistakes that can easily be corrected. The belief in 
free markets has produced a significant redistribution of wealth in society. It has legitimized the 
fantasy of less regulation—of what has been euphemistically called “deregulation.” By playing 
on this fantasy, the financial and political architects of our economy over the past four decades—
both Republicans and Democrats—have been able to mask massive redistribution by claiming 
they were simply “deregulating” the economy, when all along they were actually reregulating to 
the benefit of their largest campaign donors. 
The reregulation of the economy over the past forty years has had tangible effects on 
distributions of wealth in the country. As the sociologist Douglas Massey minutely documents in 
his book Categorically Unequal, following decades of improvement, the income gap between the 
richest and poorest in this country has dramatically widened since the 1970s, resulting in what 
social scientists now refer to as a U-curve of increasing inequality.55 Recent reports from the 
Census Bureau confirm this, with new evidence last month that “the number of Americans living 
below the official poverty line, 46.2 million people, was the highest number in the 52 years the 
bureau has been publishing figures on it.”56 Today, 27% of African-Americans and 26% of 
Hispanics in this country—more than 1 in 4—live in poverty.57 One in 9 African-American men 
between the ages of 20 and 34 are incarcerated. Not to put too fine a point on it: today, as 
                                                            
55 Douglas S. Massey, Categorically Unequal: The American Stratification System (Russell Sage, 2008). 
56 Sabrina Tavernise, “Soaring Poverty Casts Spotlight on ‘Lost Decade,’” New York Times, September 
13, 2011 (available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/14/us/14census.html?_r=2&scp=1&sq=poverty%20levels&st=cse ).  
57 Id.  
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Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times reports, “the 400 wealthiest Americans have a greater 
combined net worth than the bottom 150 million Americans;” “The top 1 percent of Americans 
possess more wealth than the entire bottom 90 percent;” and “in the Bush expansion from 2002 
to 2007, 65 percent of economic gains went to the richest 1 percent.”58 These are real effects 
shaped, in part, by the dominant belief in free markets, privatization, and “deregulation.”  
This, I take it, would be one precise articulation of a possible claim of illusion or fantasy. 
Naturally, it raises a number of questions along the different dimensions and valences of the 
terms that we might use—delusion, illusion, fantasy, or phantasm, or ideology. Are the 
categories of free and regulated markets the product of a wish-fulfillment? Do they satisfy 
desires? Are they productive in either positive or negative ways? Are we fooling ourselves when 
we believe them? Are we responsible for these beliefs, at fault for continuing to believe? Are 
there others who are projecting these images for us to consume? Are there people running a 
phantasmagoria? These are some of the questions that I imagine would be posed by the different 
vocabulary. Let me address a few of them.  
To begin with, does the belief in the free market satisfy anyone’s desires or fulfill a wish? 
As a factual matter, I believe, it could be shown that the wealthier in our society have indeed 
benefited during the recent period of renewed faith in free markets since the 1970s. The truth is, 
the complex regulatory mechanisms necessary for a colossal late-modern economy like ours 
inevitably distribute wealth in large and small ways. Tax incentives for domestic oil production 
and lower capital gains rates are obvious illustrations. But there are all kinds of more minute 
rules and regulations surrounding our wheat pits, stock markets, and economic exchanges that 
have significant wealth effects: limits on retail buyers flipping shares after an IPO, rulings 
                                                            
58 Nicholas Kristof, “America’s ‘Primal Scream,’” New York Times, October 15, 2011. 
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allowing exchanges to cut communication to non-member dealers, fixed prices in extended after-
hour trading, even the advent of options markets.59 The mere existence of a privately chartered 
organization like the Chicago Board of Trade, which required the state of Illinois to criminalize 
and forcibly shut down competing bucket shops, has large distributional wealth effects on 
farmers and consumers—and, of course, bankers, brokers, and dealers.60 The growing economic 
inequality in this country during a period that can only be fairly described as “neoliberal” 
suggests that the belief in the free market may well have served the economic interests of the 
political and social elite, who shape state regulation. It has certainly not served the economic 
interests of the middle- and lower-class (most members of the Tea Party and the Occupy 
movement, for instance). This has been productive for many, clearly, but not for others. For the 
former, it has been somewhat better perhaps than wish-fulfillment. For the latter, it may satisfy a 
desire without necessarily realizing it.  
What exactly is that desire? For the mass of Americans who do not benefit materially 
from these beliefs—and I am thinking here, naturally, of the vast majority of Tea Party members 
who do not form part of the top wage-earners in this country—what desires are being met? The 
fact is, the vast majority of Tea Party members seem to embrace the free market. It is something 
that largely defines the movement. The Tea Party Patriots, an umbrella organization of more than 
two thousand local Tea Party groups that best reflects the grassroots origins of the movement, 
has taken as its motto “Limited government, fiscal responsibility, and free market.”61 These are a 
constant refrain throughout the larger social movement—and one that is, arguably, revealing. 
Dick Armey states in Give Us Liberty, for instance, that “The most powerful, proven instrument 
                                                            
59 Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets 
60 Id.  
61 Zernike, at p. 143. 
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of material and social progress is the free market. The market economy, driven by the 
accumulated expressions of individual economic choices, is the only economic system that 
preserves and enhances individual liberty.”62 Sarah Palin echoes these sentiments in Going 
Rogue: “No one person is smart enough to control and predict markets. The free market is just 
that: free to rise or fall, shrink, or expand, based on conditions that are often outside human 
control.”63 Palin adds: “Government interference in market cycles is just as dangerous as 
government-directed programs that encourage permanent dependency. In both cases, the rewards 
for responsible behavior and the penalties for irresponsible behavior are removed by the state.”64 
Or, more succinctly, Palin declares, “America was built on free-market capitalism, and it’s still 
the best system in the world.”65 Similarly, Glenn Beck declares in his Common Sense: “You 
cannot take away freedom to protect it, you cannot destroy the free market to save it, and you 
cannot uphold freedom of speech by silencing those with whom you disagree. To take rights 
away to defend them or to spend your way out of debt defies common sense.”66  
What these passages reveal is the intimate connection between the belief in the free 
market and the wish for freedom and individual liberty. Also, the connection with being an 
American and patriot, and, as such, somewhat superior to others of other nationalities and 
cultures. In this sense, it may well have a dimension of the illusion, in a Freudian sense, insofar 
as it satisfies particular desires. This is, at least, consistent with what Kate Zernike has found. 
Zernike writes: “To its activists, the Tea Party movement quickly became something more than a 
                                                            
62 Matt Kibbe and Dick Armey, Give Us Liberty, pg 156 (quoting and endorsing the “Contract from 
America”). 
63 Sarah Palin, Going Rogue: An American Life, p. 390. 
64 Sarah Palin, Going Rogue: An American Life, p. 390. 
65 Id. at p. 360. 
66 Glenn Beck and Joe Kerry. Glenn Beck's Common Sense: The Case Against an Out-of-Control 
Government, Inspired by Thomas Paine. Threshold Editions, 2009. p. 17. 
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protest. It was more like a religion. It had given them a community, and it had given them a 
cause, which they embraced like a crusade.”67 Zernike continues: “The language and the symbols 
of the movement helped encourage that sense of mission, the feeling that they were the true 
patriots. But for many people, there was enough appeal in simply having that community, a place 
to get out their frustrations. Outsiders who underestimate the movement failed to appreciate how 
much it had come to mean to those involved.”68 It is also consistent with many of the writers on 
whom Tea Party members draw inspiration, such as Ayn Rand, Friedrich Hayek and Milton 
Friedman, William F. Buckley and the French philosopher, Frederic Bastiat.69 Glenn Beck has, 
as we all know, sent sales of The Road to Serfdom skyrocketing.70  
 The belief in free markets, moreover, is not merely delusional in the sense that it’s not 
just self-deception. There are proponents of the idea of free markets who have aggressively 
promoted the theories, including thinkers such as Hayek and Friedman, and politicians such as 
President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. But, as I’ve argued elsewhere, I 
do think it is also important to explore the subjective dimension of these beliefs.71 It is a bit too 
easy to always be pointing fingers at neoconservative thinkers and to absolve ourselves. In fact, a 
large part of the critical intervention in The Illusion of Free Markets is precisely to explore our 
own involvement in the widely shared belief—shared, as we have seen, by a vast majority of the 
American people—in the incompetence of government regulation. It is important to explore how 
                                                            
67 Zernike, at p. 124. 
68 Zernike, at p. 124. 
69 See, for example, Noah Kristula- Green, “Tea Party Embraces Ayn Rand,” July 31st, 2010, 
 http://www.frumforum.com/conservatives-make-room-for-ayn-rand; McBride, at p. 3; Dick Armey on 
Friedman at p. 69; Zernike at p. 128. 
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71 Harcourt, ‘Radical Thought from Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, through Foucault, to the Present: 
Comments on Steven Lukes’s ‘In Defense of False Consciousness,’” University of Chicago Legal Forum, 
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come, exactly, the idea has flourished since the 18th century; why there has been such little 
resistance; and what other interests or fantasies it has served in the process. What has made it so 
irresistible to so many people?  
And here, I suspect, part of the answer must lie in the seduction of freedom. The appeal 
of liberty is indeed a powerful motivator—especially when it is tied, as it has been since the 
Physiocrats, to the notion of orderliness. Hayek himself recognized this well.72 The idea of 
natural order is so seductive. As David Harvey suggests, “Concepts of dignity and individual 
freedom are powerful and appealing in their own right. Such ideals empowered the dissident 
movements in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union before the end of the Cold War as well as the 
students in Tiananmen Square.”73 They are precisely what made the Physiocrats sound so 
revolutionary in their day. It is what gave them so much momentum and made them influential. 
And it is what propelled their rationality into the twenty-first century. 
Conclusion 
Renata Salecl provocatively writes, in Choice, that, “Following Walter Benjamin’s 
prediction that capitalism would function as a new form of religion, some today argue that the 
market has become God: until the recent financial crisis anyone opposed to the dogma of the free 
market economy was labeled a heretic.”74 It is amusing to discover, in light of this, that a recent 
survey of religious attitudes revealed that an unexpectedly large percentage of Americans 
associate the free market with god.  
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According to the most recent Baylor Religion Survey of 1,714 American adults, 
conducted by Gallup Poll in the Fall of 2010 under the auspices of Baylor University, the 
National Science Foundation, and the John Templeton Foundation, about 20% of Americans 
“combine a view of God as actively engaged in daily workings of the world with an economic 
conservative view that opposes government regulation and champions the free market as a matter 
of faith.”75 As sociologist Paul Froese, co-author of the survey, suggests, “They say the invisible 
hand of the free market is really God at work.”76 “They think the economy works because God 
wants it to work. It's a new religious economic idealism,” Froese explains. “When Rick Perry or 
Michele Bachmann say ‘God blesses us, God watches us, God helps us,’ religious conservatives 
get the shorthand. They see ‘government’ as a profane object — a word that is used to signal 
working against God’s plan for the United States. To argue against this is to argue with their 
religion.”77  
The concepts of fantasy, illusion, and phantasmagoria were, from the start, closely 
associated with the religious sphere. Recall that Marx drew on religion as the best analogy for 
the mystification of commodity fetishism, and Freud explored the future of religion as illusion. It 
is amusing to think that reality now mimics theory. In the end, the religious dimension remains 
extremely enlightening because it underscores the extent to which beliefs that are non-
evidentiary become so true and sticky.  
What bothered Foucault most in the term illusion, in his later work, was that it connoted 
(to him at least) that the beliefs could be easily dismissed as false or did not have “real” effects. 
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There is something to that, on some interpretations of the term illusion. Freud, for instance, 
imagined that psychoanalysis could dispel illusions. He wrote, regarding the illusion that 
children are without sexuality, that the belief could be “destroyed by psycho-analysis.”78 Some 
might argue, of course, that the full psychoanalytic method is extremely demanding. I have no 
doubt that is true. But Foucault’s point, ultimately, rings true as well. In the end, it is important 
to recognize how these imaginaries—how the regimes of truth, illusions, fantasies—have truthful 
effects. That they have real effects. Real effects of truth. And it is these effects that matter most.  
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